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1  Pursuant to Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, amici state that no person
or entity, other than the individual amici, authored this brief in whole or in
part, or made any monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief.  Letters of consent to the filing of this brief from all parties have
been lodged with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule 37.3.
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
Amici are professors and scientists with scholarly or
professional interests in the intersection of law and science.  The
various amici have taught, researched, and published on issues
involving law, science, and policy.  Brief summaries of the
qualifications and affiliations of the individual amici are provided at
the end of this brief.
Amici have an interest in seeing that the Court is informed on
the appropriate use and limitations of science in setting national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act.
While amici support reliance on science to assess the risks of
alternative air quality standards, science alone cannot provide a
principled justification for setting such standards.  
Amici file this brief solely as individuals and not on behalf of
the institutions with which they are affiliated.  In addition, amici take
no position on the merits of the specific air quality standards at issue
in this case.  Rather, their views address the broader question of the
role of science in the process by which the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) sets air quality standards.1 
BACKGROUND
The Clean Air Act calls for the EPA Administrator to use her
“judgment” to select a primary NAAQS that is “requisite to protect
the public health” based on the criteria document and allowing “an
adequate margin of safety.”  42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1).  The statute
also specifies that the criteria document shall “reflect the latest
22  Under the Clean Air Act, “welfare” effects refer to non-human biological
and physical effects, not monetary measures of impacts as economists use
the term.
3  EPA, Ozone Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,857 (July 18, 1997); EPA,
PM Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,653 (July 18, 1997).
scientific knowledge” about the public health and welfare2 effects of
the pollutant in question.  Id. § 7408(a)(2).
At every step in this proceeding, including before this Court,
EPA has purported to rely exclusively on scientific factors to justify
its selection of revised NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter
(PM).  Even though EPA appears to acknowledge in its rulemaking
preambles that setting air quality standards is a “policy choice,”3 the
only criteria it identifies for making such choices are scientific ones.
In its brief filed in this Court, EPA identified three types of
limitations on its NAAQS rulemaking discretion which the Agency
argues satisfy the “intelligible principle” requirement. Brief for
Petitioner U.S. EPA, No. 99-1257, at 23-24  (July 21, 2000)
(hereinafter “EPA Br.”).  The three limitations are the criteria
documents reflecting “the latest scientific knowledge,” the advice
from the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
(CASAC), and the rulemaking requirements of section 307(d) of
the Clean Air Act.  The latter “limitation” is procedural only, while
the first two factors emphasize scientific inputs. 
Likewise, in the NAAQS rulemakings, EPA justified the
selection of its NAAQS standards based exclusively on health
effects and scientific criteria.  For example, EPA claimed to select
its ozone standard based solely on “public health policy judgments
in addition to determinations of a strictly scientific nature,” with
assessments of risk playing a “central role in identifying an
appropriate level.”  62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (quotation omitted).
The only type of public health “policy judgments” that EPA
3identified were factors such as the nature and severity of health
effects, the types of health evidence, the kind and degree of
uncertainties involved, and the size and nature of the sensitive
populations at risk.  Id. at 38,883; EPA Br. at 5.
Finally, in testimony to Congress on the proposed ozone and
PM NAAQS, EPA’s Administrator stated that “[a]s you can see
from the description of the process I went through to choose
proposed levels on ozone and particulate matter, the focus has been
entirely on health, risk, exposure and damage to the environment.”
Testimony of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator, Before the
Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Reform
and Oversight (Apr. 23, 1997) (1997 WL 10571215).  In
defending her selection of the proposed standards to the public, the
Administrator reportedly claimed that “I think it is not a question of
judgment, I think it is a question of science.”  Air Quality
Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be
Finished by July 19, EPA Says, 27 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2068
(Feb. 14, 1997).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Throughout this proceeding, EPA has identified no policy or
normative criteria to justify its NAAQS standards, thus suggesting
that science alone can be used to determine the appropriate air
quality standard.  Science plays a critical, indeed essential, role in
evaluating the risks of possible air quality standards being
considered for adoption by EPA.  However, science by itself
cannot provide the justification for selecting a particular air quality
standard.  Especially in setting standards for non-threshold
pollutants, such as in this case, scientific evidence cannot alone
indicate where the standard should be set, since any level above
zero will cause some health effects.  To provide a principled and
44  The term “science” as used throughout this brief refers to the natural
sciences.
consistent basis for justifying the setting of such standards at some
level above zero, EPA must articulate other factors -- whether they
be costs or other policy criteria -- to guide its decisions on where
to set national ambient air quality standards.
ARGUMENT
As in the proceedings below, EPA’s brief filed in this Court
identifies no factors or criteria other than scientific evidence to guide
its selection of revised primary national ambient air quality standards
for ozone and particulate matter.  While science4 is a critical, indeed
essential, input in developing standards, science alone cannot
provide an “intelligible principle” to guide policy decisions about the
level at which to set EPA’s revised NAAQS.
  
I. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR RISK MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
Science has played a prominent and important role in agency
regulatory decisions, as well as in judicial review of those decisions.
Such reliance on science is justified given the advances that science
has made over the past few decades in understanding environmental
risks.  Yet, purporting to rely solely on science to answer questions
science is not designed to address is as misguided as it would be to
disregard relevant scientific information.  Science plays an
appropriate and central role in regulatory agencies’ assessments of
risk, by providing systematic and reliable knowledge about the
world.  In contrast, risk management decisions, including decisions
on setting health standards, are ones for which science alone cannot
provide a principled foundation.  
55  Such risk assessment policy judgments include factors such as which
health effects to consider and to group together, the type of models and
(continued...)
A. Science Describes and Explains
As this Court recently noted, science is “a process for
proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world.”
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
590 (1993) (citing Brief for American Association for the
Advancement of Science et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8).  As such,
science seeks to supply verifiable descriptions of, and explanations
about, what is, rather than imposing judgments about what should
be.  Science describes, it does not prescribe.
B. Risk Management Prescribes
In the context of health and environmental risks, science plays
a critical role in identifying, describing, and quantifying risks, but it
does not tell us whether such risks are acceptable or should be
reduced.  The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recognized
this distinction in its influential 1983 report known as the “Red
Book,” which established a framework for risk analysis on which
regulatory agencies continue to rely today. NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983)
(“NAS Red Book”). 
The NAS distinguished risk assessment from risk
management.  It defined risk assessment as “the characterization
of the potential adverse health effects of human exposures to
environmental hazards.”  Id. at 18.  Risk assessment is based on
scientific information, supplemented with what have been termed
“risk assessment policy” judgments to bridge gaps and uncertainties
in the scientific evidence.  Id. at 37.5  Risk assessment is considered
65  (...continued)
assumptions to use in the risk assessment, how to extrapolate data from one
small segment of a population to the entire population, and how to compute
and present uncertainties.  NAS Red Book at 29-33.  These risk assessment
policy judgments are comparable to the “public health policy judgments”
that EPA identified as a basis for its NAAQS decisions.  See 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,883; supra  pp. 2-3.
6  E.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science,
17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195, 211 (1987) (noting that analysts have “agreed that
very little in a typical risk assessment could be labeled as pure science”);
DANIEL M. BYRD III & C. RICHARD COTHERN, INTRODUCTION TO RIS K
ANALYSIS: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO SCIENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING
6-8, 330-34 (2000) (risk assessment inherently and inevitably involves some
judgment).
7  See also  Craig N. Oren, Run Over By American Trucking Part I; Can EPA
Revive Its Air Quality Standards? , 29 ENVT’L L. REP. 10,653, 10,660 (Nov.
1999) (“the decision of who should be protected, and what effects they
should be protected against, is an ethical decision, not a scientific one”).
8  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING
DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 26 (1996).  This report cautioned
(continued...)
to be predominantly -- though not exclusively6 – based on scientific
evidence and analysis.
Risk management, on the other hand, is “an agency decision-
making process that entails consideration of political, social,
economic, and engineering information with risk-related information
to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory options and to select
the appropriate regulatory response to a potential chronic health
hazard.”  NAS Red Book at 18-19.  Risk management “necessarily
requires the use of value judgments on such issues as the
acceptability of risk and the reasonableness of the costs of control.”
Id. at 19.7  As a subsequent National Research Council report
reiterated, “science alone can never be an adequate basis for a risk
decision” because “[r]isk decisions are, ultimately, public policy
choices.”8  This Court has likewise recognized that the setting of
78  (...continued)
against too strict of a separation between risk assessment and risk
management, because non-scientific deliberative and policy factors can also
be relevant to risk assessment.  Id. at 34. 
9  In the Court’s 1980 review of OSHA’s benzene occupational exposure
standard, Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion stated: “[W]hen the
question involves  determination of an acceptable level of risk, the ultimate
decision must necessarily be based on considerations of policy as well as
empirically verifiable facts.  Factual determinations can at most define the
risk in some statistical way; the judgment whether that risk is tolerable
cannot be based solely on a resolution of the facts.” Industrial Union Dep’t,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 706 (1980).  The plurality
opinion quoted Justice Marshall’s statement, and then responded: “We
agree.  Thus, while the Agency must support its finding that a certain level
of risk exists by substantial evidence, we recognize that its determination
that a particular level of risk is ‘significant’ will be based largely on policy
considerations.”  Id. at 655 n.62 (plurality opinion).
10  See also  WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RI S K 75-76 (1976)
(“Determining safety, then, involves two extremely different kinds of
activities... Measuring risk  - measuring the probability and severity of
harm–is  an empirical, scientific activity; Judging safety– judging the
acceptability of risks, is a normative, political activity.”).
health and environmental standards is primarily a policy rather than
scientific undertaking.9 
Risk assessment is therefore understood to be predominantly
(but not exclusively) a scientific undertaking, whereas risk
management decisions, including the selection of standards, require
making value judgments that extend beyond the scope of science.10
The National Academy recommended that regulatory agencies
should “maintain a clear conceptual distinction between assessment
of risks and consideration of risk management alternatives; that is,
the scientific findings and policy judgments embodied in risk
assessments should be explicitly distinguished from the political,
economic, and technical considerations that influence the design and
choice of regulatory strategies.”  NAS Red Book at 7.
811  E.g., EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk Characterization
2 (Feb. 1995) (available at http://www.epa.gov/ORD/spc/rcguide.htm) (“In
1984, EPA endorsed these [NAS] distinctions between risk assessment and
risk management for Agency use, and later relied on them in developing risk
assessment guidelines.”) (endnotes omitted) [hereinafter EPA Risk
Characterization Guidance]; EPA, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,960 (Apr. 23,
1996) (citing NAS report in adopting risk assessment guidelines “to ensure
that the risk assessment process was maintained as a scientific effort
separate from risk management.”).
EPA has endorsed and relied on the NAS’s distinction
between risk assessment and risk management.11  For example, in
a recent EPA guidance on conducting risk analysis, EPA directed
that agency staff should clearly separate risk assessment from risk
management, with risk assessment involving the selection, evaluation
and presentation of “scientific information,” but not “decisions on
the acceptability of any risk level for protecting public health or
selecting procedures for reducing risks.”  EPA, Risk
Characterization Guidance, supra note 11, at 3.
In contrast, EPA noted that risk management decisions should
be based on, to the extent permissible, a consideration of
“technological feasibility (e.g., treatability, detection limits),
economic, social, political, and legal factors,” in addition to the
output of the risk assessment process.  Id.  According to EPA,
“risk assessors and risk managers should understand that the
regulatory decision is usually not determined solely by the outcome
of the risk assessment.”  Id.  In order to make risk assessments
“transparent,” EPA has further stated that it is important “that
conclusions drawn from the science are identified separately from
policy judgments and risk management decisions.”  63 Fed. Reg.
43,756, 43,769 (Aug. 14, 1998).
912  Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COL. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).
3. Agencies Can Use Science as a “Charade”
Notwithstanding broad acceptance that science alone cannot
justify judgments about acceptable levels of risk,  regulatory
agencies such as EPA may find it expedient to cloak policy
judgments under the guise of science.  Professor Wendy Wagner
has dubbed this practice a “science charade,” which occurs when
“agencies exaggerate the contributions made by science in setting
[environmental] standards in order to avoid accountability for the
underlying policy decision.”12
Professor Wagner identified several political, legal and
institutional incentives for agencies to engage in the science charade
by exaggerating the role and capability of science in making
environmental decisions.  Id. at 1650-73.  For example, the strong
deference that reviewing courts give EPA’s scientific determinations
creates “strong and virtually inescapable incentives to conceal
policy choices under the cover of scientific judgments and
citations.”  Id. at 1663.  Professor Wagner identified previous
NAAQS rulemakings as examples of a science charade.  Id. at
1640-44.
  
II. SCIENCE ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS
FOR THE OZONE AND PM NAAQS
Science is central to evaluating the health risks of possible
alternative air quality standards, but the decision of which standard
to adopt is a risk management determination.  As such, standard-
setting should utilize all the available scientific evidence on health
effects, but also needs to incorporate policy considerations.
Scientific data on ozone and particulate matter do not and cannot,
10
13  See Congressional Testimony of John D. Graham, Director of Harvard
Center for Risk Analysis, on Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Oct. 14, 1999)
(1999 WL 27595650) (“scientific information (alone) does not typically
provide an intelligible basis for the setting of safe (yet non-zero) amounts
of air pollution.”).
14  Science can provide a distinct starting point for standard-setting for a
pollutant for which the scientific evidence indicates a threshold in the
exposure-response relationship, although the decision to set the standard
at or below the threshold is itself a policy rather than scientific
determination.  In such cases, the Administrator can focus on how far below
the threshold to set the standard to achieve an “adequate margin of safety,”
which also is a policy decision. 
without more, provide a principled justification for the level at which
the respective NAAQS are set.13  
A. Science Alone Cannot Guide Standard-Setting for
Non-Threshold Air Pollutants 
The scientific data for ozone and PM indicate a continuum of
health effects down to background (or natural) concentrations of
the pollutant in the air, at which point the health effects associated
with the pollutants cannot be distinguished from effects caused by
other factors.  There appears to be no clear demarcation of a
discrete threshold below which a standard could be set to avoid all
health effects.14  EPA acknowledges that there is probably no
threshold level for ozone below which no health effects would be
expected to occur: 
The Administrator’s decision to propose the level of an
8-hour primary O3 standard at 0.08 ppm ... necessarily
reflected a recognition ... that it is likely that O3 may
elicit a continuum of biological responses down to
background concentrations.... Thus, in the absence of
any discernable threshold, it is not possible to select a
level below which absolutely no effects are likely to
11
15  See also id. at 38,867 (“Clearly, for pollutants, such as O3, that have no
discernable thresholds for health effects, no standard can be risk-free.”).
With respect to particulate matter, EPA similarly noted that “the single most
important factor influencing the uncertainty associated with the risk
estimates is whether or not a threshold concentration exists below which
PM-associated health risks are not likely to occur.”  62 Fed. Reg. at 38,656.
The Agency also recognized that the alternative PM standards it considered
“will not be risk-free.”  Id.
occur.  Nor does it seem possible, in the
Administrator’s judgment, to identify a level at which it
can be concluded with confidence that no “adverse”
effects are likely to occur.
62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (citation omitted).  EPA further
acknowledged that “no standard within the range of levels and
forms considered in this review, including the selected standard is
risk-free, due to the continuum of risk likely posed by exposures to
ambient O3 potentially down to background levels.”  Id. at
38,873.15  
Given a continuum of health effects, science provides
information on the frequency and severity of adverse effects at
various levels, but this information by itself does not identify the
level at which to set the standard.  For non-threshold pollutants, the
only standard that could conceivably protect against all health
effects would be a standard set at the level of zero, an option that
EPA has explicitly ruled out.  E.g., 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (“a
zero-risk standard is neither possible nor required by the Act”).  
EPA’s own Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
concluded with respect to ozone that “there is no bright line which
distinguishes any of the proposed standards (either the level or the
number of allowable exceedences) as being significantly more
protective of health” and “[c]onsequently, the selection of a specific
12
16  Closure Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee, to Administrator Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30, 1995), at 3 (EPA-
SAB-CASAC-LTR-96-002) (emphasis added).
17  Written Statement of George T. Wolff, Chair, EPA’s Clean Air  Scientific
Advisory Committee’s Panels on Ozone and PM, for the House Comm. on
Health and Env’t, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations  (Apr. 10,
1997) (1997 WL 10569483).
18  EPA Br. at 27 (“When examining this kind of scientific determination, as
opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at
its most deferential.”) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S.
87, 103 (1983)).
level and number of allowable exceedences is a policy judgment.”16
In testimony to Congress, the Chair of CASAC reiterated that “the
decisions to select a given level or number of allowable
exceedences within their proposed ranges cannot be based on
science;” rather, the selection of a particular standard is “strictly a
policy judgment.”17
B.   EPA’s Exclusive Reliance on Science to Justify its
Standards Creates the Appearance of a “Charade”
In its brief filed in this Court, as well as in the proceedings
below, EPA has defended its selection of its revised ozone and PM
NAAQS based solely on scientific grounds.  See pp. 2-3, supra.
In addition, EPA suggests that this Court should be highly
deferential to its selection of NAAQS standards precisely because
it is a “scientific determination.”18  EPA’s justification for its
NAAQS standards appears to fit the pattern of what has been
called a “science charade,” in which an agency attempts to use
science to justify its standards,  even though the level and form of
the standards is not something that science alone can determine.  
Scholars have suggested that EPA has not been forthright in
justifying its selection of current and past NAAQS standards based
13
19   Wagner, supra  note 12, at 1640-44 (EPA’s reliance on scientific and
medical evidence alone to justify its previous ozone NAAQS is a “vivid
illustration” of an “intentional science charade”); R. SHEP MELNICK,
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 261 (1983)
(“There is, in short, no simple answer to the question of how the EPA sets
air quality standards.  Medical evidence cannot offer definitive guidance....
The EPA itself has refused to deal with the problem in a forthright manner,
hiding its policy choices behind its interpretation of scientific evidence.”);
Graham, supra  note 13 (“When multi-billion dollar rulemaking decisions are
made, it is inevitable that regulators will consider the consequences of their
actions as well as the reasonableness of the relationship between risks,
benefits and costs.”).
20  DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUES OF SCIENCE IN
THE LAW 187 (1999).
21  Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality Standards,
24 ENVTL. LAW 821, 833 (1994).
solely on science, when the selection of such a standard necessarily
depends on risk management value judgments.19  Professor David
Faigman, for example, has recently argued that the “real loser in the
PM/ozone drama was candor”:
The debate was phrased almost entirely in terms of
science when the science played a decidedly minor role
in the actual decision.... Science should not be used to
hide what are essentially the true bases for decision.20
Amici do not purport to know the “true bases” of EPA’s selection
of its NAAQS, only that science alone cannot provide a consistent
and principled basis for its standard-setting. 
EPA claims to exclude, for example, considerations of costs
and feasibility in setting air quality standards.  However, as
Professor Joseph Feller, a former EPA attorney, has written, “[i]f
all costs are truly ignored, then no risk would be acceptable.”21
Scholars and commentators from a diverse range of viewpoints
14
22  E.g., FAIGMAN, supra  note 13, at 183 (“In practice, therefore, despite the
legal technicality limiting EPA to promulgating regulations solely to promote
health, costs are an integral part of the policy-making process at EPA.”);
MELNICK, supra  note 12, at 297 (“[R]egulators inevitably consider cost [in
setting air quality standards].  But presently they cannot explain how they
do.”); MARC K. LANDY, MARC J. ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 238
(1990) (“[I]n the absence of any threshold for risk, some balancing between
costs  and benefits had to be implicit in the standard setting decision – a
reality EPA neither acknowledged nor forced the Congress to confront.”);
George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit
Consideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
in MARY GIBSON (ed.), TO BREATHE FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 222, 229
(1985) (it is a “policy fiction” that costs are not considered in setting
NAAQS); Oren, supra  note 7, at 10,662 (“EPA inevitably must therefore
consider costs  in standard-setting to help decide how stringent to make the
standards.”); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 253 (1991)
(“The institution has considered costs and benefits, and the advice that the
Administrator receives orally from subordinates reflects those
considerations.”); Gary E. Marchant, Turning Two Blind Eyes: The EPA’s
Failure to Consider Costs and Health Benefits in Revising the Ozone
Standard , 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J.  261, 267-68 (1998) (EPA failed “to ‘come clean’
about the true nature of its decision-making”); C. Boyden Gray, The Clean
Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 235, 235 (1998) (“The
plain fact is that the EPA has for a long time considered costs and benefits
in setting ambient standards–only it has done so behind closed doors....”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV.
303, 317-318 (1999) (“Only insiders know for certain whether EPA does in
fact consider costs in issuing national ambient air quality standards,” but
evidence suggests  that “costs do matter in the context of standard-setting
for nonthreshold pollutants.”).
have argued that EPA does consider costs in setting its air quality
standards, even though it excludes consideration of costs in its
public justification for its standards.22  Dr. John Graham, Director
of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, has further argued that
EPA’s “legal fiction” that it does not consider costs when setting
NAAQS is “dysfunctional” because “it (1) reduces  political
accountability for value judgments and political choices, [and] (2)
hides from public scrutiny claims that are made about risks, benefits
15
and costs (since such claims are driven ‘underground’ in the course
of regulatory deliberations).”  Graham, supra note 13.  
EPA’s exclusive reliance on science to justify its standard
selection thus creates the appearance that the Agency is using
science to shield its decision-making from scrutiny. See Wagner,
supra note 12, at 1656 (agencies may be able to find refuge from
controversial public debates by relying on the science charade);
MELNICK, supra note 12, at 297 (“Far from opening agency
decisionmaking to public view, the courts have allowed and
encouraged the EPA to sustain a myth and to keep secret its
bureaucratic motives.”).  More significantly, such reliance prevents
the Agency from including  the careful and open consideration of
relevant policy considerations in its justification for its air quality
standards. 
III.  PRINCIPLED STANDARD-SETTING REQUIRES
CONSIDERATION OF MORE THAN SCIENCE
The EPA has available to it several alternative approaches by
which it could incorporate policy considerations into the reasons it
provides for setting and revising NAAQS.  Such alternative
approaches have been relied upon by the EPA and other agencies
in other contexts and have been endorsed in the risk management
literature.  By adopting one or more of these approaches and
openly addressing the policy choices reflected in each, EPA can
provide a more principled and consistent explanation for its air
quality standards.
The Agency could begin by establishing an acceptable risk
level as its core policy criterion.  For example, EPA has defined
“acceptable risk” for hazardous air pollutants based on a maximum
individual mortality risk of no greater than 1 in 10 thousand.  54
Fed. Reg. 38,044 (Sept. 14, 1989).  The agency has similarly set
acceptable risk levels to guide its decision making under other
16
23    The Agency has  defined acceptable risk targets under the Clean Water
Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (“Superfund”), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act, and the Safe Drinking
Water Act.  See generally March Sadowitz & John D. Graham, A Survey of
Residual Cancer Risks Permitted by Health, Safety and Environmental
Policy, 6 RISK 17 (1995).
24  Comparative risk analysis may also be helpful in deciding acceptable risk
levels, in which the Agency would compare ozone or PM risks to similar
risks from other causes.  See generally J. CLARENCE DAVIES, COMPARING
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS (1996).
25  The Court of Appeals found that EPA had failed to consider such risk-
risk tradeoffs in setting its ozone standards.  American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental  Protection Agency, 175 F. 3d 1027,
1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   Because it did not seek review of that holding by this
Court, EPA is required to consider such risk-risk tradeoffs on remand. 
statutes.23  To be sure, extending this “acceptable risk” approach
to NAAQS will be complicated by the diverse range of types and
severity of health effects attributed to ozone or PM exposure.
Moreover, using such an approach would mean that the acceptable
risk level would become the standard no matter what the costs of
achieving it. Nevertheless, if the Agency chose to pursue such an
approach in order to establish an intelligible principle for setting air
quality standards, it could then apply its acceptable risk criterion to
select the least burdensome standard that results in an acceptable
level of risk.24 
Alternatively, the Agency could find a principle for standard-
setting in the comparison of the adverse health and environmental
effects of pollutants to any countervailing, beneficial effects of those
pollutants (such as screening out harmful ultraviolet radiation).25
The Agency would thereby select a level that minimizes overall risk.
In such instances of risk-risk tradeoffs, the Agency would combine
scientific information about risk with policy judgment about how
best to resolve the tradeoff.  See generally JOHN D. GRAHAM &
17
26  Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn,
Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell, Richard
Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and Robert N. Stavins, Is There a Role for
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?,
272 SCIENCE 221(1996).
27  Sunstein, supra  note 22, at 378 (“The problem is  that it is impossible to
assess ‘safety’ in a cost vacuum.  In general cost-benefit analysis should be
followed, acknowledging that it will raise some hard questions of value.”)
28  See Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good Than Harm”:
A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20
ECOL. L. Q. 379 (1993).
JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995). 
Another option is for the Agency to consider the full range
of costs, beyond countervailing health risks, that can be anticipated
to arise from a proposed standard.  The Agency could use these
broader estimates of costs to balance against estimated benefits in
determining the level at which to set a standard.  As already noted,
it may be that EPA already tacitly takes costs or feasibility
considerations into account.  By openly incorporating the use of
economic analysis into its decision making, the EPA could provide
a consistent basis for setting particular air quality standards.  As a
group of distinguished economists has collectively noted, “[t]he
estimation of benefits and costs of a proposed regulation can
provide illuminating evidence for a decision, even if precision cannot
be achieved.”26  In the case of non-threshold pollutants,
consideration of costs would not only be illuminating but also is
probably inevitable.27  Open deliberation of both benefits and costs
by the Agency would provide a principled basis for setting air
quality standards.28
  
Finally, as with costs, the Agency could incorporate into its
decision-making explicit and detailed considerations of issues of
18
29  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 6, at 40
(noting that “[f]or some interested and affected parties in risk decisions,
managing environmental risks has become a question of  fairness, moral
responsibility, and distributional equity.”)
equity.  It would be relevant to risk management decisions for the
Agency to consider how the effects of alternative standards may be
distributed within society, such as whether health risks are
differentially distributed across different racial and socio-economic
groups.29
EPA’s current approach, purporting to rely exclusively on
scientific evidence of adverse health effects, has precluded it from
openly adopting alternative approaches that would provide a more
reasoned basis for guiding its policy judgment.  As with any risk
management decision, to justify air quality standards in a principled
manner the EPA should expressly consider policy criteria such as
acceptable risk, costs, risk-risk tradeoffs, or equity in addition to all
the available science.
CONCLUSION
The lower court’s conclusion that EPA “offers no intelligible
principle by which to identify a stopping point” (175 F.3d at 1037)
is well supported by an understanding of the appropriate role that
science is able to play in risk management decision making.  While
science can identify the level and severity of the health effects from
different levels of exposure to ozone or PM in various populations,
science alone cannot establish what is acceptable for society. 
   Respectfully submitted,
19
GARY E. MARCHANT
Center for the Study of Law,    
Science and Technology
Arizona State University 
   College of Law
P.O. Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85257-7906
(480) 965-3246
  CARY COGLIANESE
  Counsel of Record
  Harvard University
  John F. Kennedy School of      
   Government
  79 John F. Kennedy Street 
  Cambridge, MA 02138
  (617) 495-1402
SEPTEMBER 11, 2000
20
APPENDIX
IDENTIFICATION OF AMICI
GARY E. MARCHANT is Associate Professor of Law at Arizona
State University School of Law, and a Faculty Fellow at the Center
for the Study of Law, Science and Technology at the same
institution.  His academic degrees include a J.D. from Harvard in
1990, an M.P.P from the Kennedy School of Government in 1990,
and a Ph.D. in Genetics from the University of British Columbia in
1986.  His research and teaching interests include Environmental
Law, Risk Assessment and Management, Genetics and the Law, and
Law, Science, and Technology. 
CARY COGLIANESE is Associate Professor of Public Policy at
Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.  He
received his J.D., M.P.P. (public policy), and Ph.D. in political
science from the University of Michigan.  His interdisciplinary
research in administrative and environmental law explores the impact
of procedural design and judicial review on the regulatory process.
He teaches in the areas of law, regulatory policy, and ethics.
DANIEL M. BYRD III received both B.A. (1964) and Ph.D. (1971)
degrees from Yale University.  Since 1988, Dr. Byrd has directed
Consultants in Toxicology, Risk Assessment and Product Safety
(CTRAPS), a scientific support firm that helps clients acquire,
interpret, and use biomedical information.  Previously, he conducted
independent research into mechanisms of chemotherapeutic drugs at
Roswell Park Memorial Institute and at the University of Oklahoma.
He subsequently held positions in the Office of Chemical Control, the
Office of Pesticide Programs, the Carcinogen Assessment Group,
and the Science Advisory Board (SAB) at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
GAIL CHARNLEY is an internationally recognized expert in
environmental  health risk assessment and risk management science
and policy.  Dr. Charnley has over 20 years of experience in
environmental toxicology, human health risk assessment, and risk
21
management.  During its tenure, she was executive director of the
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management, mandated by Congress to evaluate the role that risk
assessment and risk management play in federal regulatory
programs.  She is immediate past-president of the international
Society for Risk Analysis and holds an adjunct faculty position at the
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis.
MAUREEN L. CROPPER is a Professor of Economics at the
University of Maryland, a  Lead Economist at the World Bank and
a University Fellow at Resources for the Future.  She is past
president of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists and chairs the Advisory Council on Clean Air
Compliance Analysis, a subcommittee of EPA’s Science Advisory
Board.  Most of Dr. Cropper’s research has dealt with valuing
environmental amenities, especially environmental health effects,
both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective.  Her current
research deals with valuing the health impacts of pollution in
developing countries and with the economics of deforestation.
E. DONALD ELLIOTT is Professor (Adjunct) of Law at Yale Law
School and Georgetown University Law Center, and a  Partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker.  He
is a former Assistant Administrator and General Counsel of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency from 1989-1991, and was
previously the Julien and Virginia Cornell Professor of Environmental
Law and Litigation at Yale Law School.  His research interests are
in Law and Science, Environmental Law, and Administrative Law.
He is Advisor on Law and Science to the Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology and Government, the Federal Courts Study
Committee and the Federal Judicial Center.
DAVID L. FAIGMAN is a Professor of Law at the University of
California, Hastings College of Law. He writes extensively on
subjects related to the law’s use of science. He is a coauthor/coeditor
of the three volume work Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law
and Science of Expert Testimony (West Group, 1997, 2000 Supp.)
(with David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks and Joseph Sanders). He is
22
also the author of the recently published book, Legal Alchemy: The
Use and Misuse of Science in the Law (W.H. Freeman & Co.
1999). 
JAMES K. HAMMITT is Associate Professor of Economics and
Decision Sciences at Harvard University.  His research concerns the
development and application of quantitative methods -- including
benefit-cost, decision, and risk analysis, game theory, and
mathematical modeling -- to health and environmental policy. His
current research topics include the management of long-term
environmental issues with important scientific uncertainties, such as
global climate change and stratospheric-ozone depletion, the
evaluation of ancillary benefits and countervailing risks associated
with risk-control measures, and the characterization of social
preferences over health and environmental risks using revealed-
preference and contingent-valuation methods.  He received his Ph.D.
in 1988 from Harvard University. 
JAMES E. KRIER is Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law at the
University of  Michigan Law School.  He has taught and written in
the field of environmental law for thirty years.  He is the author of
Environmental Law and Policy (1971), with a second edition
published in 1978 (with Richard Stewart).  He is also the co-author
(with Ursin) of Pollution and Policy (University of California Press
1977). 
WILLIAM HENRY LASH, III is Professor of Law at George
Mason University School of Law, and Distinguished Senior Fellow at
the Center for the Study of American Business, Washington
University.  He is also an Adjunct Fellow at  Citizens for a Sound
Economy and Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College School of
Law.  He has testified before Congressional committees, spoken
before industry and business associations, and written on the limits of
EPA regulatory authority and the law and economics of climate
change.
ROGER O. McCLELLAN is President Emeritus of the Chemical
Industry Institute of Toxicology, having served as President of the
23
Institute from 1988 through 1999, and is an Adjunct Professor at
Duke University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North
Carolina State University, University of New Mexico, and
Washington State University.  Dr. McClellan has served as past
Chairman of EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, is a
member of the Executive Committee of EPA’s Science Advisory
Board, has served on several past and current committees of the
National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, and has
served in an advisory role to numerous other governmental and
private organizations on toxicology issues.  He has received
numerous honors, including election to membership in the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences.  
THOMAS W. MERRILL is Professor of Law, Northwestern
University School of Law.  He was formerly a Deputy Solicitor
General (1987-1990) of the United States.  His academic interests
are centered on Administrative Law but also include Environmental
Law and Constitutional Law.
LARS NOAH is a Professor of Law at the University of Florida.
His scholarly work has focused on questions of law and medicine,
administrative procedure, and products liability, and he has done work
for the National Institutes of Health and National Academy of
Sciences (Institute of Medicine).
JOYCE E. PENNER is a Professor in the Department of
Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space Sciences at the University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, and is Director of the Laboratory for
Atmospheric  Science and Environmental Research.  She has ongoing
research relating to improving climate models through the addition of
interactive chemistry and the description of aerosols and their direct
and indirect effects on the radiation balance in climate models. These
models run in both a parallel computing environment and vector
supercomputers. She has an ongoing interest in urban, regional and
global tropospheric chemistry and budgets, cloud and
aerosol interactions and cloud microphysics, climate and climate
change, model development and interpretation. 
24
ROBERT PHALEN is a Professor of Community and Environmental
Medicine at the College of Medicine of the University of California,
Irvine, CA. He is also the Director of the Air Pollution Health Effects
Laboratory at the University of California, Irvine.
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI is Professor of Law at Cornell Law
School.  His academic degrees include a B.A./M.A. in Psychology
from the Johns Hopkins University (1988), a J.D. from Stanford Law
School (1993), and a Ph.D. in Psychology from Stanford University
(1994).  Dr. Rachlinski was a National Science Foundation Graduate
Fellow in psychology at Stanford University from 1989 to 1993, and
a visiting associate professor at the University of Chicago Law
School in the spring of 1999.  His research interests primarily involve
the application of cognitive and social psychology to law, but also
include some aspects of Environmental Law.
JOSEPH SANDERS is A.A. White Professor of Law at the
University of Houston. He earned both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in
sociology from Northwestern University. His research and writing
interests include mass torts and scientific evidence. He is the author
of Bendectin on Trial (1998) and is a co-editor of Modern
Scientific Evidence (1997). 
ROBERT N. STAVINS is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business
and Government, and Faculty Chair of the Environment and Natural
Resources Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.  He is a University Fellow of Resources for the
Future, the Chairman of the Environmental Economics Advisory
Committee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Science
Advisory Board, and a Member of EPA’s Clean Air Act Advisory
Committee, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the
editorial boards of several scholarly journals.  He directed Project 88,
a bi-partisan effort co-chaired by former Senator Timothy Wirth and
the late Senator John Heinz, to develop innovative approaches to
environmental and resource problems.  Prior to coming to Harvard,
he was a staff economist at the Environmental Defense Fund.
25
JONATHAN B. WIENER is Professor at the Law School and at the
Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, where he
writes and teaches on issues of environmental law and risk
regulation.  In 1999 he was a visiting professor at Harvard Law
School.  His writing includes Risk vs. Risk  (1995) (with John
Graham) and “Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management,”
9 Risk 39-82 (1998).  He has served as President of the Society for
Risk Analysis, Research Triangle Chapter, and as a senior aide in the
President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), the Office of
Science & Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Department of
Justice, in both the Clinton and Bush administrations.  He clerked for
Judge Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. District Court, EDNY, and for Judge
Stephen G. Breyer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, after
graduating from college and law school at Harvard.
JAMES D. WILSON is Senior Fellow and leader of the risk analysis
program in the Center for Risk Management at Resources for the
Future.  An organic chemist by training, he spent twenty-nine years
with the Monsanto Company, in research, research management and
then health and environmental policy.  His research has focused on
structure-activity relationships, including environmental chemistry
broadly, “dioxin” and related chemicals, relation of chemical structure
to physical and physiological properties, the use of science in decision
making, and the influence of organizational structure on decision
making.   His current research at RFF concerns the development and
use of standardized risk assessment practices, particularly default
options. He was President of the Society for Risk Analysis in 1993
and was named a Fellow of the Society in that year.  He holds an
A.B. from Harvard and a Ph.D. (organic chemistry) from the
University of Washington.
